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I. Introduction
From the 1970s onwards New Classical Economics attracted much attention in the
economics profession. Both the ‘realism’ of its assumptions and the relevance of its
conclusions have been severely criticized.’ This criticism was particularly directed
against Sargent and Wallace’s (1976) policy-irrelevancy proposition, which holds
that anticipated monetary policy does not have real effects. As Klamer’s (1985)
analysis of the ‘rhetorics’ of New Classical Economics (NCE) has shown, though,
the controversy reflects considerable confusion about the central issues at stake in the
‘rational-expectations revolution’. This becomes clear from the fact that New Clas-
sicals have been criticized on grounds which they themselves considered less
important.3  This constitutes the raison-d’2tre  of studies that try to sort out what the
‘revolution’ was all about.
The studies of Maddock  (1979, 1984) and Klamer (1981, 1985) have been the
first to address this question. The former rationally reconstructs Lucas’s contribu-
tions to the rise of the NCE along Lakatosian lines. He shows that Lucas (1972b)
provided the initial formulation of the rational expectations research programme by
combining Friedman’s (1968) Natural Rate Hypothesis (NRH) with Muth’s (1961)
‘rational expectations hypothesis’ (REH). In its most extreme version the resulting
‘joint NR/RE  hypothesis’ holds (1) that deviations from the ‘natural rate equilibrium’
(NRE) are due to a lack of information on the part of the economic agents, and (2)
that the resulting expectational errors are unsystematic. This was a novel prediction,
so that Lucas’s derivation of the joint hypothesis may be considered theoretically
progressive. Maddock  (1984, 295) further shows that Lucas’s subsequent contribu-
tions aimed to develop (1) tests in order to provide empirical support for the
programme’s novel prediction, and (2) procedures which would protect the joint
hypothesis from refutation. In other words, they were not geared towards novel
predictions, but instead tried to protect the joint NR/RE  hypothesis which formed the
programme’s hard core. The consequent danger of theoretical as well as empirical
degeneration of the programme was averted by Sargent’s (1973b)  novel prediction
that deviations of output from its natural rate in any period are independent from any
information available in policy rules at the moment of prediction. Sargent and
Wallace (1975, 1976) subsequently tested this prediction by evaluating the respective
predictive powers of ‘natural rate’ and ‘unnatural rate’ models. Since it involved a
novel fact, this shift in attention from the joint NR/RE  hypothesis to the analysis of
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the implications of rational expectations for the theory of economic policy constituted
a progressive problem shift in the rational expectations programme. It led Maddock
(1984, 291-292) to conclude that “.  . . even though its roots are in monetarism, [the
NCE] is more likely ultimately to find a place within the theory of policy.”
As De Marchi  (1990) pointed out, Maddock’s reconstruction focuses on deduced
test implications and novel facts, neglecting the underlying process of ‘discovery’. In
De Marchi’s  view, though, Lucas has never put much weight to empirical tests and
the test results, and was more interested in apparent side issues, such as the Lucas
critique. De Marchi  therefore claimed that technical and conceptual considerations
have played a more prominent role in Lucas’s research agenda than the test implica-
tions. That is, the conclusions-generating process (the heuristic) itself has been more
important in the development of Lucas’s work than its outcomes.4  This conclusion is
supported by the fact that Lucas’s (1973) test of the joint NR/RE  hypothesis did not
fully capture all knowledge available at the time, so that the epistemic value of his
generative process was not fully reflected in its outcomes.’ De Marchi  (1990)
subsequently analyzed this process, taking Lakatos’s ‘pluralistic model’ as his
starting point.
Lakatos (1970, 128-131) developed his pluralistic model in his attempt to
explain why it can be rational (and intellectually honest) for scientists to adhere to
theories that appear to be refuted by the facts. What he called ‘naive falsificationism’
holds that such a refutation should lead to a rejection of the theory in question.
Agassi (1966, 18) had already argued that scientists may I’.  . . stick to the hypothesis
[i.e. theory, RvZ]  in the face of known facts in the hope that the facts will adjust
themselves to theory rather than the other way round.” However, he had not given
an (normative) answer to the question under what conditions such an outcome should
prevail. Lakatos’s ‘sophisticated falsificationism’ tries to give such an answer. It
starts from the insight that there are no such things as ‘hard facts’. And since the
‘hardness’ of facts may thus be disputed, scientists may seek recourse to an appeal
procedure in order to save their theories from rejection.
According to Lakatos’s (1970, 129) pluralistic model, any explanation of an
observed phenomenon contains two aspects (or ‘theories’), one interpretative and one
explanatory.6  The former aspect contains all ‘theories’ that are necessary to yield the
facts to be explained. These theories may concern such wide-ranging issues as the
appropriate way to translate certain concepts into measurable variables, the best ways
to measure these variables, or even the views about the (non-)rationality of the
human actions which are reflected in the concepts and variables. The explanatory
aspect, on the other hand, consists of the formal model actually developed in order
to motivate the interpretative aspect. Both aspects may be closely related, although
this does not mean that they cannot be inconsistent. In fact, Lakatos (1970, 129)
argued that a refutation reflects such an inconsistency. To put it in his own words,
“[i]n the pluralistic model the clash is not ‘between theories and facts’ but . . .
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between an interpretative theory to provide the facts and an . . . explanatory theory to
explain them” (italics in original). De Marchi’s  paper on Lucas’s work in the late
1960s and early 1970s shows that such an inconsistency may constitute an important
internal source for scientific dynamics.’
Both Maddock  and De Marchi  restricted their respective analyses to the role
played by Lucas in the rise of the NCE.8  This raises the question how other New
Classical economists came to join this programme. In his conversation with Klamer
(1985, 63),  Thomas J. Sargent recalled that as a second- or third-year graduate
student he became aware of the fact that there was no link between (neoclassical)
theories and statistical tests. The latter treated the data probabilistically, thus
assuming that agents act in an environment in which there is uncertainty, whereas
neoclassical economics assumed this uncertainty away. In the early 1970s he
considered this defect remedied, in the sense that “[t]he  stochastic or random
variables in new classical models provide the statistical properties that econometric
testing requires; the rational expectations hypothesis introduces the necessary
dynamic element” (in Klamer 1985, 244). Sent (1993) questioned this assessment.
Her reconstruction of Sargent’s early work shows that the link could only be
established by assuming that random variables have finite variances. In her view,
though, the adoption of this crucial assumption was hardly justified.
The above studies on Sargent’s contributions to New Classical Economics stress
his work in the field of econometrics. Consequently, they do not pay much attention
to the economic-theoretical content of his work, presumably because of the complex-
ity of social (scientific) reality. The present paper aims to supplement the above
studies in this regard. Taking De Marchi’s  (1990) considerations about the generat-
ive process into account (see above), it aims to show how Sargent’s conclusions-
generating process involved a change of his explanation of the Gibson paradox. The
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some early solutions to the Gibson
paradox, and particularly those of Keynes (1930) and Fisher (1930). Section 3
outlines Sargent’s interpretation and criticism of the latter’s solution. It reflects the
fact that Sargent considered this solution inconsistent with the rationality postulate.
Section 4 describes how this forced him to choose between the postulate and the
formal model (i.e. the explanatory theory). Favouring the former over the latter, he
thus faced the problem of providing an alternative explanation of the paradox.
Section 5 discusses how he solved this problem by changing both the interpretative
and explanatory aspects of his explanation of the paradox. Section 6 subsequently
addresses the empirical tests of this alternative explanation. The tests yielded rather
unfavourable results. However, Sargent considered the derivation of the tests more
important than their outcomes, and hence did not reject his explanation. Instead, he
adopted three types of defenses. Section 7 contains a summary and the main con-
elusions  .
II. Some early solutions to the Gibson paradox
Sargent’s work in the late 1960s and early 1970s was concerned with the relationship
between the general price level and the rate of interest. In his ‘Commodity price
expectations and the interest rate’ (1969) he addressed what Keynes (1930) had
called the ‘Gibson paradox’. ‘Classical’ theory implies that a rise (fall) in the interest
rate produces deflationary (inflationary) pressures because of the gap between
desired savings and investment, and the ensuing fall (rise) in effective demand. It
thus predicts that the price level moves in the opposite direction as the interest rate.
However, Gibson (1923) found that in reality the interest rate and the price level
tend to move together, thus confronting ‘classical’ economic theory with an anoma-
ly. Presumably the best known solutions to this anomaly are those of Keynes (1930)
and Fisher (1930).9
Following Wicksell  (1898),  Keynes (1930, 203-204) argued that the Gibson
paradox is the result of the relative stickiness of the market rate of interest (rJ as
compared with the natural rate of interest (r-J.  This means that the former cannot
maintain equilibrium between ex-ante saving (S)  and ex-ante investment (Z).  Since r,
is presumed to exhibit long-term movements, r,,,  will fail to equilibrate S and I. More
particularly, if r,,  is rising (falling), then r,,  > (<  ) r,,,  and hence Z > (<) S. In turn,
this means that the price level will fall (rise).” To summarize, a fall (rise) in-r,,  has
two effects. Firstly, it induces a fall (rise) in r,. Secondly, it ensures that I < (>)
S, bringing about a fall (rise) in the general price level. The interest rates and this
price level thus move together.
Fisher (1930, 43) provided an alternative explanation of the paradox. He distin-
guished between the monetary and the real rate of interest. In equilibrium the former
equals the latter plus the rate of inflation. In a situation of perfect foresight, econ-
omic agents will fully anticipate increases (decreases) in the rate of inflation, and
will respond in such a way as to leave the real rate of interest unaffected. However,
Fisher (1930, 44) opined that economic agents suffer from an ‘I...  almost universal
lack of knowledge”, so that their inflationary expectations are unlikely to come true.
The unanticipated increases (decreases) in the rate of inflation will not be reflected
immediately in what may be called the ‘inflation premium’ in the nominal interest
rate. Hence the real rate of interest will be distorted. However, the expectational
errors bring about an adjustment process, moving the real rate of interest towards its
equilibrium value. This equilibrating process raises (lowers) the nominal rate of
interest in response to some increase (decrease) in the rate of inflation. Fisher thus
explained the Gibson paradox in terms of expectations adjustment. That is, he
interpreted the positive correlation between the nominal rate of interest and the rate
of inflation as the result of economic agents revising their expectations.
In his empirical work Fisher (1925, 184) and (1930, 419) used a formal model
(an explanatory theory) that included what later came to known as the ‘adaptive
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expectations hypothesis’ (AEH). This hypothesis holds that the expectations adjust-
ment process can be described as a distributed lag function. Fisher found that the lag
weights of this function declined slowly, and that the transition period was therefore
rather long (Fisher 1930, 427). His estimates suggested that it could take no less
than ten to thirty years before the effects of unanticipated changes in the inflation
rate were incorporated in the nominal rate of interest, and even then the adjustment
was still incomplete. In Fisher’s (1930, 429) view, this length of the lag results from
an intervening factor, namely “.  . . business, as exemplified or measured by the
volume of trade.” His explanation runs in terms of what may be called Fisher’s
indirect efict,  which holds that unanticipated price increases and lagging factor
remunerations lead entrepreneurs to earn larger profits. Consequently, they will
increase ex-ante investments and hence their demand for credit. Given the propensity
to save, banks will be forced to raise the nominal interest rate in order to avoid
liquidity problems. This rate thus follows the upward movements in the rate of
inflation, albeit with a lag.”
To summarize Fisher’s position, we can identify an interpretative and an
explanatory aspect of his explanation of the Gibson paradox. The former holds that
the positive correlation between the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation
is due to expectational errors. The length of the adjustment lag was seen as the result
of an intervening factor, namely ‘business’ (or aggregate demand). These interpreta-
tive theories were translated into a formal model, an explanatory theory. This model
contained a distributed lag function that was intended to capture the length of the
adjustment period. However, it did not fully express the interpretative aspects of
Fisher’s theory, because it did not specify the intervening factor ‘business’. This
may have wrong-footed Sargent in his early efforts to deal with the Gibson paradox.
III. A problematical interpretative theory:
the implausible length of the transition period
Sargent (1969) also tried to explain the Gibson paradox in terms of expectations
revision processes on the part of the economic agent. Both he and Fisher interpreted
the positive correlation between the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation
as the result of expectational errors. Nevertheless, Sargent’s (1969) interpretative
theory differed considerably from that of Fisher. The latter argued that the length of
the lags between changes in the rate of inflation and in the nominal rate of interest
reflects the influence of an intervening factor, called ‘business’. In contrast, Sargent
interpreted Fisher’s distributed lag function as an expectations formation mechanism.
His interpretative theory thus dispenses with the intervening factor, and instead
explains the length of the lags as the result of sluggish expectations revision pro-
cesses only. Given Fisher’s estimates of these lengths, this means that it would take
ten to thirty years before economic agents would have learnt the new rate of
inflation, and would act accordingly. Sargent concurred with Cagan (1965, 257) that
such sluggish expectations revision is rather implausible. In his view, rational
economic agents would revise their expectations more quickly. Sargent’s (1969)
interpretative theory thus turned out to be inconsistent with another of his interpreta-
tive theories, the rationality postulate. Initially, he tried to remove this inconsistency
by distinguishing two effects. The extrapolative e@ct holds that an increase
(decrease) in the general price level induces economic agents to expect prices to rise
(fall) still further. It thus tends to shorten the transition period. In contrast, the
regressive efict  holds that rising prices generate short-term expectations of a fall in
the general price level. According to Sargent (1969, 138),  “[t]he  presence of such a
[regressive] component of expectations was rational, given the cyclical properties of
price movements over the period we are considering.” In his view, this latter effect
was responsible for the sluggish adjustment of expectations and hence for the
implausible length of the transition period. It should be noted, though, that the two
effects fail to solve Sargent’s problem. Firstly, they were not included in his formal
model, so that his explanatory theory did not fully capture his interpretative theory.
Secondly and more importantly, the effects allow for systematic expectational errors
which may be easily detected and corrected. Consequently, Sargent’s explanation of
the Gibson paradox was in danger of being inconsistent with the rationality postulate.
This possible inconsistency did not merely pose a theoretical problem for Sargent: it
had an important econometric repurcussion as well.
In his 1971 paper ‘A note on the “accelerationist” controversy’, Sargent showed
that the inconsistency between his interpretative theory and the rationality postulate
invalidated a common test of the NRH.‘*  His argument can be made clear with the
help of the following equation:
(3.1) $t = m “1-i
t -1 a ; vi  p + f <q,  . ..) + E,.t-1-1
in which the present relative change in nominal wage rate (AwJw,,)  is expressed in
terms of past inflation rates (LLp,i/P,i-,),  and some other variables. The equation
combines the ‘natural rate hypothesis’ (NRH) with the AEH. The NRH is supposed
to be corroborated if the coefficient of the past inflation rates, (Y,  and hence the
public’s inflation expectation, is close to unity, whereas it is rejected if it is closer to
zero. Estimation of the parameters is possible only if some restriction is added.
According to Sargent (1971, 34),  “[allmost always, the constraint that has been
imposed is that the distributed lags in [the AEH] sum to unity.” This constraint is
justified by the argument that in the long run rational economic agents will fully
incorporate an unexpected change in the rate of inflation into their price-expectati-
ons. In other words, given the interpretation of distributed lag functions as expecta-
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tions adjustment mechanisms, the unity-restriction is assumed to capture the rational-
ity postulate. However, adaptively formed expectations fully reflect all changes in
the rate of inflation only if the new inflation rate remains unaltered for quite some
time (otherwise expectations are always lagging). Sargent (1971) observed that in
reality this is never the case. Given the fact that agents are presumed to form their
expectations according to the AEH, this implies that they will make systematic
expectational errors. As shown above, this may be inconsistent with economic
rationality. Instead, it may be argued that rational economic agents will try to
minimize their errors. Such minimization occurs if their expectations formation
mechanism is compatible with the observed (actual) behaviour of the rate of infla-
tion. Sargent therefore suggested that the most reasonable restriction which can be
imposed on the sum of the distributed lags is the one which is compatible with this
observed behaviour. He subsequently showed that this appropriate restriction is that
this sum is less than unity (Sargent 1971, 3536). Consequently, the unity-restriction
leads to underestimation of (IY,  in which case the estimates of the common test ‘I...
tell us virtually nothing about the validity of the accelerationist thesis” (Sargent
1971, 37). That is, the inconsistency between economic rationality (as reflected in
the unity-restriction) and the interpretative theory (according to which the distributed
lag function represents the AEH) distorts the test results of the common test, so that
its usefulness as an empirical test of the NRH is severely diminished. The question
then arises how this inconsistency can be eliminated, so that these estimation
problems can be avoided. This question may be addressed with either of the
following three strategies. Firstly, the inconsistency may be resolved by abandoning
the rationality postulate. Expectations revision processes then need not be rational,
and hence may take up to thirty years. Secondly, the interpretative theory may be
changed while leaving the explanatory theory unaffected. This means that the length
of the transition periods has to be explained in terms of some rational expectations
revision process, whereas the model describes this process as a distributed lag
function. Thirdly, the explanatory theory may be changed as well, so that the
explanation runs in terms other than expectation revision.
IV. M&h-rationality  as the key to consistency
Sargent’s first step towards the removal of the inconsistency is to be found in his
‘Anticipated inflation and the nominal rate of interest’ (1972),  in which he tried to
improve the formal model (explanatory theory) which Fisher had used in his empi-
rical work. This model can be formulated as follows:
(4.1) rt  = Pt  + x,
(4.2) ’ pt  = a + E,
where r, is the nominal rate of interest, pt is the real rate of interest, T, is the
anticipated rate of inflation, c~ is a constant, and E,  is a stochastic term which is
uncorrelated with the nominal rate of interest. Equation (4.2) holds that the antici-
pated rate of inflation does not affect the real rate of interest (see Sargent 1972, 212-
213). However, in transition periods economic agents make expectational errors
about the rate of inflation, so that the actual rate of inflation cannot be fully reflected
in the nominal rate of interest. This implies that the real rate of interest must have
changed. Consequently, equation (4.2) cannot hold in transition periods, and hence it
must be replaced. The question then arises as to the correct way of modelling the
relationship between the nominal rate of interest and the anticipated rate of inflation.
This question was addressed Sargent’s ‘Interest rates and prices in the long run’
(1973a).
Sargent (1973a) started his analysis by performing a test of the length of the
transition period, based on the equations (4.1) and (4.2). He combined them with the
AEH, which yielded equation (4.3):
(4.3) r,=a+yC1’-
A!‘p,-i
i=O  ‘pi-l
+ Et
where r,  is the nominal rate of interest, CY  is a constant, the sum is the adaptively
formed expected rate of inflation, and .+  is a stochastic term which is uncorrelated
with the nominal rate of interest. Sargent estimated this equation for the U.S. in the
period 1870-1940. The resulting estimates of the ‘decay parameter’ h were close to
unity. He concluded that “[tlhese estimates corroborate the main outlines of Fisher’s
findings” (Sargent 1973a,  392).13  Fisher’s explanatory theory thus proved to be
satisfactory, in the sense that it was consistent with the ‘data’ as provided by
Sargent’s interpretative theory. However, as Sargent (1973a,  392) noted, “[wlhile
Fisher’s explanation of that [i.e. the Gibson] paradox formally ‘works’, the implied
lags in forming expectations do seem extraordinarily long.” The inconsistency
between the interpretative theory and the rationality postulate still posed a problem.
As the above analysis already suggests, Sargent was not prepared to abandon the
rationality postulate. Consequently, he faced the problem of changing his interpreta-
tive theory. This means that he could either give a different (e.g. Keynesian)
explanation of the positive correlation between the nominal rate of interest and the
rate of inflation, or explain the length of the transition period differently. He chose
the latter option, arguing that this length could not result from lagged expectations
revision. This means that he replaced the AEH with some other expectations
formation mechanism. In Sargent’s view, Muth’s (1961) ‘rational expectations
hypothesis’ (REH)  formed an appropriate alternative mechanism. This hypothesis
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holds that.expectations are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant
economic theory. Or, as Muth (1961, 316) formulated more exactly, “... expecta-
tions of firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distributions of
outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the prediction
of the theory (or the ‘objective’ probability distributions of outcomes).” This
quotation makes clear that the agents’ information sets play a crucial role in their
expectations formation process. If a theorist wants to obtain definite outcomes of the
assumed expectations formation mechanism (as Muth did), he must make assump-
tions with regard to the content of these sets. Therefore, Muth (1961, 3 17) used
(‘[fJor purposes of analysis . . .“)  a ‘specific form’ of the REH. He assumed that the
random disturbances are normally distributed. Individuals are also assumed to know
these distributions, which means that on average their expectations are correct. That
is, the expectations of the ‘representative individual’ are based on all relevant
information. The forecasts of economic agents will then be identical (in a probabi-
listic sense) to those of statistical and economic theory, and in this sense they can be
considered ‘rational’. The problem with this Muth-rationality was, though, that it
could not explain the lag between changes in the rate of inflation and in the nominal
rate of interest. This means that the substitution of the REH for the AEH did not
suffice. Sargent (1973a) therefore tried to supplement his interpretative theory.
V. Sargent’s alternative interpretative theory:
the influence of omitted variables
Sargent (1973a) argued that in his empirical work Fisher had only taken into account
a one-way causal relationship between the rate of inflation and the nominal rate of
interest, with causality running from the former to the latter. In this sense the infla-
tion rate is exogenous. Sargent opined that this is unduly restrictive, and that it
would be more appropriate to transform the interest rate into an endogenous
variable. He suggested to test Fisher’s model for feedback from the nominal rate of
interest to the rate of inflation, using the Granger-Sims notion of causality as an
indication of causation. Such a test involves the estimation of the influence of past
inflation rates on the current nominal rate of interest. The relevant test equation then
becomes:
(5-l) rt = C hj Pt-j + Vr
j=-ml
where m,  and m,  are positive parameters, the  are the estimated distributed lag
parameters, and v, is a statistical residual. Given the Granger-Sims notion of causal-
ity, the existence of a feedback from the nominal interest rate to the rate of inflation
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means that future values of the latter are correlated with current values of the for-
mer. Hence Sargent tested the hypothesis that hj = 0 for all j < 0. The test results
indicated that ‘I..  . an explanation of the interest-inflation relationship that does not
permit feedback from interest to inflation is probably unduly restrictive” (Sargent
1973a,  p. 422). However, the inclusion of such a feedback mechanism yields an
interpretational problem of the REH, because ‘I... it will no longer be ‘rational’ to
form expectations of inflation by looking at current and lagged rates of inflation
alone, since current and past rates of interest are of some help in predicting subse-
quent rates of inflation” (Sargent 1973a,  p. 427). The interpretative theory could
thus become inconsistent with the rationality postulate, and hence Sargent’s quest for
consistency would remain unsuccessful. Therefore, Sargent tried to remove this
inconsistency by changing his interpretative theory. He abandoned the view that the
feedback from interest to inflation is due to lagged expectations adjustment on the
part of the economic agents, and instead argued that what appears to be feedback is
actually caused by some omitted variables which influence both r and p. In Sargent’s
view, aggregate demand would be the relevant variable.
Having thus returned to Fisher’s interpretative theory, the problem of building a
consistent formal model (explanatory theory) remained. Sargent (1973a) built such a
model which describes a closed economy with one good that is produced according
to a linear-homogeneous production function in both labour  and capital. Both the
nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation are endogenous, and dependent on the
(exogenous) variable ‘money supply’ (representing aggregate demand). A once-and-
for-all change in this variable shifts the LM curve to the right, raising aggregate
demand and employment and hence nominal wages. Furthermore, the shift of the
curve lowers the nominal rate of interest, so that the real costs of capital fall below
its marginal productivity. Consequently, the rate of capital accumulation rises.
However, since the rate of money growth has not changed, this new rate of capital
accumulation cannot be sustained. Eventually, Sargent assumed, the economy will
return to its steady-state equilibrium. He concluded that “[t]he  final result of the
once-and-for-all increase in the money supply is thus to drive the level of money
wages and prices upward proportionally, and to leave the interest rate, the real
wage, and the output-capital ratio unchanged. Employment will equal the labor
supply when the steady-state is achieved” (Sargent 1973a,  435). In other words, the
model is a ‘natural-rate’ model, in which the respective long-run equilibrium values
of all real variables are independent from the path of the economy towards that
equilibrium: there is no hysteresis.‘* Sargent subsequently used this model to gener-
ate artificial data. Like the historical data, these artificial data also proved to be
infested by the Gibson paradox. His new explanatory theory (model) thus ‘worked’,
in the sense that it could explain the facts provided by his new interpretative theory.
Sargent’s model simulations affirm that he had changed his interpretative theory.
Throughout the simulations Sargent had assumed that anticipated inflation is zero.‘”
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This means that expectations about the rate of inflation did not change over the
simulations, so that ‘I... the long mean lag that characterizes the relationship between
interest and inflation has nothing to do with long lags in adjusting expectations of
inflation in response to the occurrence of actual inflation” (Sargent 1973a,  p. 441).
The length of the transition period thus had to be explained in other terms than that
of sluggish expectations revision. As was shown above, Sargent had accomplished
this by changing his interpretative theory. The transition period was now seen to
result from changes in the money supply, not from lagged expectation revision.
However, this change in interpretative theory did not solve all inconsistencies. The
assumption of zero anticipated inflation implies that there is no difference between
Fisher’s nominal and real rates of interest. As Sargent (1973a,  p. 442) noted, this
means that ‘I..  . it does not seem necessary to stress differences between nominal and
real rates of return in order to explain the Gibson paradox.” Stated differently,
Sargent’s interpretative theory had to account for the fact that both nominal and real
rates of interest are positively correlated with the actual rate of inflation. Since this
positive correlation between nominal and real variables suggests that economic
agents suffer from money illusion, it threatened to make Sargent’s new interpretative
theory inconsistent with the rationality postulate. This problem proved to be similar
to the one Lucas had faced concerning the relationship between the rate of unem-
ployment and the rate of inflation, the so-called Phillips curve. Lucas had reinter-
preted this curve as an inverse cyclical relationship, due to incomplete information
on the part of the economic agents. Sargent (1973a) chose to resolve the problem of
revising his interpretative theory in a similar manner. He argued that the relation
between the real rate of interest and the rate of inflation does not only reflect the
influence of omitted variables, but also results from incomplete information about the
nature of changes in aggregate demand and ‘I... the [ensuing] failure of wages and
prices to adjust sufficiently quickly to keep output always at its full-employment
level” (Sargent 1973a,  442). Consequently, the Phillips curve and the Gibson
paradox can be explained in similar terms. Both start from the same interpretative
theory, according to which they are short-term cyclical phenomena caused by
unanticipated changes in the money supply. As Sargent (1987, 117nl) noted, in the
long run Friedman’s NRH and Fisher’s two-equations model are two sides of the
same coin.
Lucas’s solution to the problem of explaining the Phillips curve in terms of the
actions of rational though ill-informed economic agents, as represented by the ‘Lucas
supply function’, thus proved to solve Sargent’s problem as well. It is not surprising
that in his article ‘Rational expectations, the real rate of interest, and the natural rate
of unemployment’ (1973b),  Sargent incorporated this function, thus explicitly
connecting his work to that of Lucas.
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VI. Sargent’s tests:
the relative unimportance of test outcomes
Having derived a formal model, Sargent (1973b) wanted to test this explanatory
theory. He outlined two test procedures which can be used to test the theories of
both Fisher and Friedman. Both procedures build on the insight that rational
economic agents will use all available information in forming expectations. That is,
the test hypothesis holds that the forecasts of the current unemployment rate cannot
be improved by using information available at a previous date t-l. Assuming that the
normally distributed error term in the Lucas supply function (uJ  is lagged n periods,
the test of this hypothesis involves the estimation of equation (6.1):
(6.1) E(Un,I  q-1, un,-,,  ***, Uq”-@ q+,-,)  =
= WJ+Jn,-,,  un,-,,  -., uqn-J
This equation implies that the forecast of the unemployment rate (UnJ,  based upon
its own past observations, cannot be improved by including components of the
lagged information subset I!&+,-~.  Hence the coefficients of these components will not
differ significantly from zero when added to a regression of Un,  upon lagged values
of itself. The first test procedure now assumes that the error terms are serially
correlated. According to Sargent (1973b,  176),  “[t]he  higher the order of serial
correlation in the u’s [i.e. the larger n], the more periods components of 19, must be
lagged to warrant the implication that their coefficients are zero.” However, he did
not perform this test, but instead proposed a second procedure.
Sargent’s (1973b) second test proposal concerns the case in which u, is not seri-
ally correlated. This means that the economic agents cannot improve their forecasts
by including more information. That is, the expected value of Un,  formed on any
subset 8,, of the full information set 8,,  equals zero. This hypothesis can be tested
by regressing the current rate of unemployment upon components of the information
subset. Sargent performed this test twice. He first regressed the rate of unemploy-
ment against its own lagged values and a subset Oltel  which consisted of the lagged
price level (pt-,,  pb2,  pte3  and p,J  and the lagged nominal wage rate (w,,,  wtm2,  wtm3
and wt-J.  Testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients on these lagged variables
do not differ significantly from zero, he found that the regression corroborated this
hypothesis at the 95% confidence level. It thus appeared that his explanatory theory
was consistent with his interpretative theory. However, his second regression which
included a larger subset of 8, led to a quite different conclusion.16  Sargent again
tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the components of the enlarged
subset under consideration have zero coefficients, but this time he found that this
hypothesis was rejected at the 99% confidence level. This indicated that there was an
inconsistency between the interpretative and the explanatory theory.
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The negative result of the second test does not mean, of course, that the null
hypothesis should be rejected. In fact, Sargent (1973b,  177-178) adopted three types
of defenses against such a rejection. Firstly, he implicitly subscribed to the Duhem-
Quine thesis when arguing that the assumption about the absence of serial correlation
in the disturbance terms u’s may not hold.” Furthermore, these terms may also be
correlated with components from the information set. In both cases the test result
will be biased towards discorroboration of the null hypothesis. Secondly, Sargent
adopted the methodological position of sophisticated falsificationism, which holds
that a theory should not be rejected unless some better alternative is available. He
argued that there is no way of knowing whether such a better alternative theory
exists until a comparative test (a ‘horse race’) between a ‘natural rate’ and an ‘unna-
tural rate’ equation is performed. Sargent (1973b) formulated these respective
equations as follows:
(6.2) Un,  = 5 A$Jn,-,  + p(p, - EP&J  + u,
i = l
(6.3) Un, = 5 kJ$-i + P(P, - EP, let-l) +
i = l
+  PC1  - ~WP,I~,-,  - P,-J +  u,
Equation (6.2) explains deviations from the natural rate of unemployment (NRU) in
terms of random expectational errors about changes in the general price level. Hence
it is a Lucas supply function. The difference between this equation and the ‘unnatural
rate’ equation (6.3) lies in the third term on the right-hand side of the latter. This
term represents the influence of the difference between the price forecast Ep, based
on information available in the previous period, and the actual price at that time.
Since the latter is included in et-,,  the third term holds that an anticipated change in
the rate of inflation affects the actual unemployment rate. Obviously, this implication
is inconsistent with the joint NR/RE  hypothesis. Sargent tested both equations for the
United States over the period 1952:l - 1970:4,  using quarterly data. The ‘horse race’
between (6.2) and (6.3) favoured the latter, thus suggesting the rejection of the
former. Sargent defended his explanation of the Gibson paradox in a third manner,
arguing that it had not been rejected at an ‘unusually high confidence level’. This
raises the question, why such a level would be required and why a usually high
confidence level does not suffice. The answer to this question seems to lie in
Sargent’s quest after consistency between (both the interpretative and the explanatory
aspects of) his explanation of the Gibson paradox, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the rationality postulate. Having succeeded in establishing this consistency, he
refused to abandon his new explanation. This indicates that he considered the
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epistemic.value  of the derivation of the test hypotheses (i.e., of the conclusions-
generating process) greater than that of the tests themselves.‘* This conclusion is in
line with that of De Marchi  (1990) concerning the early work of Lucas. It thus
seems that the epistemic value of New Classical Economics can only be captured in
full if one takes account of its conclusions-generating processes.
VII. Summary and conclusions
Some twenty years after the rise of New Classical Economics, and the accompanying
rational-expectations revolution, it appears that the debate between its proponents and
opponents on the importance and empirical validity of its test hypotheses has been
somewhat misguided. As De Marchi  (1990) argued, Lucas never was much inter-
ested in empirical tests and their outcomes. Instead, he was concerned with technical
and conceptual considerations, so that the generative process (heuristic) itself appears
to have been more important than its outcomes. Klamer (1985) and Sent (1993)
showed that Sargent’s early work addressed similar issues, in the sense that he tried
to establish ‘conceptual integrity’ between (probabilistic) econometrics and (deter-
ministic) neoclassical economics. The present paper supplements these analyses by
showing how Sargent’s quest for consistency affected the economic-theoretical
content of his successive explanations of the Gibson paradox. In doing so, it adopts
the Lakatosian view that the heuristic is a quest for consistency among theories.
Sargent (in his pre-1973 work) interpreted Fisher’s (1930) distributed lag
function as a formalization of the adaptive expectations hypothesis (which does not
seem to be what Fisher had meant by it). Given the length of the adjustment period,
this means that it would take ten to thirty years before economic agents would have
adjusted their expectations to a change in the rate of interest, and would act accord-
ingly. This interpretative theory of the adjustment period was clearly inconsistent
with the rationality postulate. Furthermore, Sargent (1972) showed that Fisher’s
formal model (explanatory theory) was inconsistent with (Sargent’s) interpretative
theory, because it cannot describe transition periods and hence does not allow
economic agents to make expectational errors. He decided that both the interpretative
and the explanatory theory should be altered. Sargent (1973a) changed the former, in
the sense that he allowed for feedback from the nominal rate of interest to the rate of
inflation. However, this change did not solve his problem: the feedback made it
difficult to interpret the REH, because rational agents would not only base their
expectations about the rate of inflation on current and lagged rates of inflation alone,
but also on current and past rates of interest. Therefore, Sargent altered his interpre-
tative theory in another way, arguing that what appears to be feedback from interest
to inflation is caused by some omitted variables which influence both variables. The
main variable in this regard was ‘aggregate demand’ (represented by ‘changes in the
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money supply’). He conjectured that the Gibson paradox resulted from wage and
price stickiness which failed to keep output at its natural rate. Unfortunately, this
new interpretative theory also appeared to be inconsistent with the rationality
postulate, because it seems to imply that economic agents suffer from money
illusion. Sargent showed, though, that this inconsistency is similar to the one Lucas
had faced concerning the Phillips curve, thus linking his work on neoclassical econ-
omics and econometrics with the latter’s microeconomic foundations of New
Classical macroeconomics. In both cases transition periods are explained as the result
of expectational errors on the part of the economic agents, due to imperfect informa-
tion. Sargent’s (1973b) subsequent test of the hypothesis that agents cannot improve
their forecasts by including more information yielded discorroborative results.
Nevertheless, he did not reject the hypothesis, but instead defended it on three
grounds. Firstly, he noted that the assumption about the absence of serial correlation
in the disturbance term may not hold. Secondly, he adopted the methodological
position of sophisticated falsificationism, according to which a theory should not be
rejected if no better alternative is available. However, the results of a comparative
test (‘horse race’) failed to support the joint NR/RE  hypothesis. Sargent then adopted
his third reason and argued that the test had not rejected the joint hypothesis at an
‘unusually high confidence level’. This reflects the fact that he was engaged in a
quest for consistency, in which he aimed to solve technical and conceptual issues,
not to make novel predictions.
Notes
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
This article builds on Van Zijp (1993, Chapter 8). I wish to thank Jack Birner,
Willem Keizer, Rodney ‘Maddock, Neil de Marchi,  Esther-Mirjam Sent, Hans
Visser, and an anonymous referee for their useful suggestions and stimulating
comments. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.
Following Barro (1981, 41),  New Classical Economics can be characterized in
terms of four assumptions, namely (1) the assumption of continuous market
clearing; (2) the Lucas supply function (including some version of the ‘natural
rate hypothesis’); (3) the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH); and (4) some
assumption about the information set of the individuals.
For instance, Sargent (in Klamer 1985, 70) claimed that others took the neutral-
ity proposition more seriously than he and Wallace themselves did, and that
most of his recent work would not have any reason for existing if he took the
proposition seriously.
Lucas (1980, 272) already suggested that the ‘growth’ of economic knowledge
is to a considerable part due to ‘I... purely technical developments that enlarge
our abilities to construct analogue economies.” These ‘I...  include both improve-
ments in mathematical methods and improvements in computational capacity.”
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5 . De Marchi  (1990, 28, italics in original) noted that ‘I...  the test . . . makes
absolutely no use of the Lucas critique, except that awareness of the critique
told Lucas what he had to do to avoid its implications.”
6 . Following Lakatos (1970),  the term ‘theory’ is used in a rather loose sense. See
also De Marchi  (1990, 40n6).
7 . As Lakatos (1970, 133) explained, the negative heuristic of a scientific research
programme specifies the ‘hard core’ of hypotheses (‘theories’) that cannot be
refuted. The positive heuristic, on the other hand, suggests ways in which the
protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses around this core may be amended in
response to an inconsistency between two or more ‘theories’. Hypotheses in
both the interpretative and the explanatory realms may be subject to such
amendation.
8 . According to Maddock  (1984, 294),  ‘I... in 1970, a rational expectations
research program had emerged. ” In his reconstruction Sargent’s work enters the
New Classical scene only as late as 1973, when it is seen to have brought about
a progressive problem shift. Since by this time the New Classical research pro-
gramme was well under way, Maddock’s analysis implies that Sargent did not
contribute to its rise. The present paper claims instead that around 1973 two
previously independent (though theoretically related) research agendas (that of
Lucas and that of Sargent) proved to match.
9 . For a more detailed discussion of Keynes’s and other solutions of the paradox,
see Visser (1974, 143-147).
1 0 This follows from Keynes’s ‘Fundamental Equations’ (viii.) and (x.) (1930,
Book III, Chapter 10, 138).
11. Fisher’s indirect effect should not be confused with Wicksell’s indirect mechan-
ism. The latter traces the effects of changes in the money supply and the
nominal (market) rate of interest. It assumes that causality runs from the
nominal rate of interest to the price level, whereas in the case of Fisher’s
indirect effect this causality is reversed.
12. This conclusion had already been reached by Lucas (1972b,  written in 1970),
albeit along different lines. In fact, Lucas (1972b) and Sargent (1971) dis-
covered this so-called Lucas critique simultaneously and independently.
13. The estimates were derived by a search procedure. As Sargent (1973a,  391n5)
explained, “[o]ur  procedure here was first to search over h’s ranging from .l to
.9 at steps of . 1.  Having found the value of X,  say &,  that, among these nine
values of X,  delivered the smallest residual variance, we then searched again
over [X,  - .09,  X,  + .09]  at steps of .Ol for the X,  associated with the minimum
residual variance. This value was taken as our estimate of X.”
14. As Sargent (1973a,  435) himself put it, “[alssuming that the system is dynami-
cally stable, the final resting place for all variables will be the same as if [the
anticipated rate of inflation] ?r had remained at its steady-state value throughout
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the adjustment process; but the path to steady-state equilibrium may be much
different. ”
15. In explaining how his model works, Sargent (1973a,  435) allowed expectations
to change. However, in his simulations and his formal model (explanatory
theory) he assumed that such changes are absent,
16. This subset included ‘... values of the logarithm of the money supply (currency
plus demand deposits), seasonally adjusted (m),  the federal and state and local
government deficit on the national income accounts basis (DeJ>;  and the logs of
the GNP deflator, seasonally adjusted (p),  of the implicit deflator for personal
consumption expenditures (PC), of the average hourly wage rate in manufactur-
ing, seasonally adjusted (WT-),  of government purchases of goods and services
(g), of total federal and state and local government employment, seasonally
adjusted (ng), and of GNP (y). Each of these arguments is included lagged one,
two, and three periods’ (p.  178).
17. The Duhem-Quine thesis holds that a hypothesis cannot be tested in isolation, so
that negative test results may always be attributed to some of the supporting
assumptions. For a more detailed analysis, see Harding (1976).
18. In a comment on an earlier version of the present article, Rodney Maddock
argued that there appear to be at least two other alternative explanations for
Sargent’s methodological decision. The first and simplest holds that his state-
ment about the confidence level is just ‘a throwaway line’ to cover up the
weakness of his empirical results. Such a cover up is not without meaning,
though. It implies that Sargent did not find it Worthwhile to improve these
results before publishing them, presumably because in his view there were more
important issues at stake. The present article argues that he was engaged in a
quest for consistency among (interpretative and explanatory) ‘theories’. Mad-
dock’s second explanation holds that scientists are conservative, and that they do
not (and should not) abandon their theories too quickly. Again, such conserva-
tism may reveal some (implicit) preferences about the conditions which scien-
tific explanations should meet, although admittedly there may be other reasons.
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